百科名片
| 中文名： 伊曼努爾·列維納斯 | 職業： 哲學家、倫理學家、《塔木德》注釋家 |
| 法文名： Emmanuel Levinas | 主要成就： 20世紀歐洲最偉大的倫理學家 |
| 國籍： 法國 | 代表作： 《從存在到存在者》 |
人生經歷與哲學貢獻
列維納斯幼年在立陶宛接受過傳統的猶太教育。二戰後，師從神秘的猶太導師舒沙泥，研習《塔木德》（猶太教法典）。直到生命的後期列維納斯才承認舒沙泥對其學術影響的重要性。
伊曼努爾·列維納斯列維納斯於1924年在法國阿爾薩斯的斯特拉斯堡大學開始接觸哲學研究。在那裡他遇到了一生的學術夥伴——法國哲學家布朗索（Maurice Blanchot）。1928年他轉去弗萊堡大學跟隨胡塞爾研習現象學，並在那裡遇到了海德格爾。於是列維納斯成為最先關注海德格爾與胡塞爾的法國知識分子，並翻譯了胡塞爾的著作《笛卡爾之冥想》，其後也將他們的思想引介到自己的哲學之中，例如《胡塞爾現象學的直覺理論》、《實體與存在》等。
刊發於紐約時報的列維納斯訃告提到，他對自己付之于海德格爾的熱情表示遺憾，因為後者與納粹關係緊密。甚至在一次公開的演講中列維納斯提到，人們應該以寬恕之心對待德國人所犯下的罪行，但海德格爾不應被寬恕。
博士畢業後，列維納斯到巴黎的一所私立猶太中學，後進入高等教育體系。他先於1961年在普瓦提埃大學教書，後於1973年來到索邦大學，直到1979年退休。他也是瑞士弗萊堡大學的兼職教授，並於1989年榮獲巴爾扎恩哲學獎。
列維納斯於50年代進入法國知識分子的思想前沿，他的觀念基於“它者的規範”或按他自己的話講“規範為哲學第一本位”。對於列維納斯來講，它者是不可知的，並且無法凝練出基於自我的客觀規律，因為這只會囿於傳統的形上學觀念（這被列看做是本體存在論）。他更傾向於把哲學看作是“愛的智慧”而非傳統希臘語中的“智慧之愛”。這樣，規範成為獨立於主觀的實體，成為凌駕於主體的民族責任；繼而這種責任超越了客體對真實之探索的意義本身。
列維納斯在一生中曾遭遇了納粹帶來的不幸，見證了西方世界在二十世紀所經歷過的幾乎所有暴力。這些以奧斯維辛大屠殺作為頂峰的歷史暴力滲透在他的問題與思考中，以至於對他，就像阿多諾所說的，哲學的根基不再是驚奇，而是恐怖。列維納斯追問理性是如何同野蠻結合在一起的，並勇於提出要反對海德格爾式的哲學氣候（沒有倫理的“存在”），以及反對希臘哲學傳統中“中性”化的哲學概念對於倫理所具有的優先性。他認為對於哲學，還有一項偉大的工作需要完成，即“以希臘語言來講述希臘文化所不知的道理”，因此終其一生，他都在探索如何在仍然用理性的方式來思考的同時，給哲學的內在注入另一種“生氣”：給予這說著古希臘語言的哲學來自希伯來的氣息，在這不可磨滅的歷史恥辱的記憶深處，喚醒那同樣是不可磨滅的上帝的“蹤跡”。雖然列維納斯和阿多諾一樣，為了走出這恐怖而承擔起了批判“本真性行話”的思想使命，但是，與阿多諾所構想的“無人的烏托邦”不同，列維納斯思考的是一個使愛鄰人成為可能的“人的烏托邦”。列維納斯一反時代潮流地堅持思考主體和人道主義的可能性，這或許是一條更具批判性、更尖銳，但也更為積極的道路。
主要著作
《從存在到存在者》
《和胡塞爾、海德格爾一起發現存在》
伊曼努爾·列維納斯《整體與無限論外在性》
《別樣於存在或超越本質》
《倫理與無限》
中國學界對列維納斯的研究
1.楊大春等主編：《列維納斯的世紀或他者的命運》（“杭州列維納斯國際學術研討會”論文集），中國人民大學出版社，2008.
簡介：該論文集匯集了美國、英國、法國、比利時、以色利等國外著名列維納斯研究專家及國內該領域幾乎所有的著名學者的研究成果，代表了列維納斯研究的最高、最全面的成就，對於掌握列維納斯豐富多樣的思想以及他與兩希傳統複雜關係具有非常重要的參考價值。
2.王恆著，《時間性：自身與他者》，江蘇人民出版社，2008.
簡介：《時間性——自身與他者(從胡塞爾海德格爾到列維納斯)》是國內第一本對作為現象學家的列維納斯的哲學思想的追溯性研究著作。其主要觀點是：時間問題是現象學思想傳統中一以貫之的根本，胡塞爾的時間意識就是主體性本身，海德格爾認為時間性就是存在的境域，而對於列維納斯，正是在時間中才有真正的他者出現，或者說與他者的關係才真正有時間的呈現。時間之謎，就是主體之謎，就是他者之謎，列維納斯正是基於時間，才另立了“作為他者的主體”這一後現代倫理之要義。《時間性——自身與他者(從胡塞爾海德格爾到列維納斯)》適合於德國和法國哲學、後現代思潮、倫理學等方面的研究者和有興趣者。
附：列維納斯英文簡介
Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers
Anthony F. Beavers
The question of the source of the moral "ought" is no small question, nor is it
unimportant. Our own philosophical tradition has dealt with the question in several
ways producing a variety of answers. Some of these include locating the "ought" in
the structure of reason (Kant), in the human being's desire for pleasure
(Utilitarianism), or in the will of God (Aquinas). The reason why the question is so
important is because different conceptions of the source of the moral ought
ultimately give rise to different conceptions of what is right and wrong; they also
affect the way we answer the biggest of all ethical questions, why be good.
Levinas begins his answer to this question precisely with the origin of the moral
ought, which unfolds on the level of the individual. For him, ethics is, first and
foremost, born on the concrete level of person to person contact. He does not find
the moral "ought" inscribed within the laws of the cosmos, in reason, or in any
universal desire for pleasure. Instead, each individual case of moral conflict
produces the moral "ought" itself.
Today I wish to do nothing more than present an exposition of the source of
the "ought" in Levinas. [1] It will be difficult to present an argument here,
because the moral "ought" for Levinas has already occurred before reason comes on
the scene. To present a rational argument for what occurs before reason is
impossible; to do so would be to take reason into a domain where reason cannot go,
in this case, to the point of contact between one person and another. Thus, Levinas
can only have for us an evocative appeal. The goal of presenting ethics in this
fashion is not to discover the truth of ethics, but to make an appeal for ethical
transFORMation. Levinas invites us to listen, not only to what he has to say, but,
more importantly, to the voice of the Other, who sanctions all of our moral
obligation.
To get this lecture off the ground, I will derive Levinas' moral "ought" by starting
with an assumption: ethics occurs always in relation to other persons. When asked
how to define ethics, I am assuming that our answer will include an important
reference to other people. This is not necessarily to say that there can be no
ethics without at least two people -- though this is the case for Levinas. It is to
say that ethics is an important issue for us because it governs the way in which we
relate with one another. This assumption is not unfounded: indeed, St. Thomas tells
us that "harm should not be given to an other". Kant's Categorical Imperative
indicates that the moral agent should "treat humanity, whether in his/her own person
or the person of another, not only as a means but also as an end in itself." And
Mill's "principle of utility" implies others when he notes that ethics is rooted in
the notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If ethics is concerned
with the other, then it would appear that in order to fill out a complete account of
ethics, the means by which two people come in contact with each other will be
vitally important. Here, then is the root of Levinas' concern: to establish the
source of contact between persons or the source of interpersonal meaning, and in
finding this meaning, Levinas finds the ethical.
To a non-philosopher, the source of contact between persons seems to be a
superficial question. The answer is, at first, easy. The other person is met in
experience everyday, on the street, in the classroom, in the workplace, etc. To a
philosopher, however, the question is not so easy: we in the tradition recognize the
difficulties inherent in interpersonal contact. Does the other person have a mind?
Is the other a creation of my imagination, as Descartes asks looking out of his
study at the automata that pass by dressed in coats and hats? In light of these
questions, though, we can never truly deny the existence of the other in the context
of the street, the classroom, or the workplace, even if we can deny such contact in
a theoretical context. It is on the level of life, then, as opposed to that of
theory, that Levinas has his appeal.
Levinas comes directly out of the tradition established by Descartes, Kant and
Husserl. "Every idea is a work of the mind," writes Descartes in his Meditations.
[2] Ideas are created, invented by a mind, not discovered. This leaves Descartes
with a problem: "How can [ideas] that have their origin in the mind nevertheless
give us knowledge of independently real substances." [3] He answers this question
through proofs for God's existence and divine veracity. But as the tradition
progresses, Kant notes that God cannot be used within philosophy to the extent that
Descartes would like. Thus, Descartes is left alone in his world with only his
ideas: there is no contact with an other who is not an other in one of his ideas.
Husserl takes this to its logical consequences in the fifth of his Cartesian
Meditations and notes that the other is "there," present to me, but only in the
sense that the other has for me. He writes, "Consciousness makes present a 'there
too', which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an 'itself-
there'." [4] The other of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations is not an extra-mental
other, that is, one who exists independently of me; rather, the other is only the
meaning that I constitute for the other. In other words, the meaning of being an
other comes down to my interpretation of the other, an interpretation which is the
working of my own mind quite apart from what or whether the other may be.
If we can accept this notion that ideas are inventions of the mind, that ideas are,
when it comes down to it, only interpretations of something, and if ethics, in fact,
is taken to refer to real other persons who exist apart from my interpretations,
then we are up against a problem: there is no way in which ideas, on the current
model, refer to independently existing other persons, and as such, ideas cannot be
used to found an ethics. There can be no pure practical reason until after contact
with the other is established.
Given this view towards ideas, then, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the
real person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut off the
connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to refer to real other
people. This is a central violence to the other that denies the other his/her own
autonomy. Levinas calls this violence "totalization" and it occurs whenever I limit
the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise.
Indeed, it occurs whenever I already know what the other is about before the other
has spoken. Totalization is a denial of the other's difference, the denial of the
otherness of the other. That is, it is the inscription of the other in the same. If
ethics presupposes the real other person, then such totalization will, in itself, be
unethical.
If reducing the other to my sphere of ideas cuts off contact with the other, then we
are presupposing that contact with the other has already been established. And if
contact with the other cannot be established through ideas, then we must look
elsewhere. Thus, Levinas looks not to reason, but to sensibility, to find the real
other person.
Sensibility, for Levinas, goes back to a point before thought originates, before the
ordering of a world into a system or totality. [5] Sensibility is passive, not
active as thought is, and it is characterized primarily by enjoyment. Life as it is
lived, (rather than understood), is lived as the satisfaction of being "filled" with
sensations, the satisfaction of feeding on the environment.
Departing from Heidegger who maintains that we live from things through their
function as tools and implements, Levinas maintains that we live from these things
as nourishments. I eat my bread; in the activity of eating it becomes a part of my
body. I bathe in the music of Beethoven's "Moonlight Sonata"; in the activity of
bathing. I "digest" the music. It becomes me. This "living from" is a matter of
consumption, a matter of taking what is other and making it become a part of me.
Levinas writes:
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the
same, which is the essence of enjoyment; an energy that is other, recognized as
other, recognized ... as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it becomes,
in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. [6]
This taking on of what nourishes me conveys a separation between me and what has yet
to nourish me. "Enjoyment is made," writes Levinas, "of the memory of its thirst; it
is a quenching." [7] Enjoyment then includes the memory of once not having been
satisfied with what now satisfies me. Thus, enjoyment also involves stepping back
from my environment; "living from ... delineates independence itself, the
independence of enjoyment and happiness ..." [8] Before enjoyment, there is me and
the other thing that has yet to nourish me, even if the otherness of what will
nourish me becomes apparent only in enjoyment, in the "memory" of its thirst. I can
represent the bread, but this will not feed me. I must eat it. But then in eating my
bread, the memory of hunger, evinces a separation between the bread and me. Thus, in
enjoyment, the self emerges already as the subject of its need.
If Levinas is correct, then, the human being starts first as happy, satisfied with
the plenum of sensations. He/she enjoys them. This enjoyment as independence is the
initial FORMation of the I. But, this self, the self of enjoyment, constitutes an
egoism. It is happy, but selfish. The self of enjoyment journeys into the world to
make everything other part of itself, and it succeeds very well at this task. Cohen
summarizes all of this nicely:
[Sensation] is called "happiness" because at this level of sensibility the subject
is entirely self-satisfied, self-complacement [sic], content, sufficient. Instead of
[rational] synthesis, there are vibrations; instead of unifications, there are
excitations; rather than an ecstatic self, there are margins of intensities,
scattered stupidities, involutions without centers -- egoism and solitude without
substantial unity; a sensational happiness ... This event does not happen to
subjectivity, this eventfulness, this flux, is subjectivity. [9]
Thus, Levinas finds on the level of sensibility a subjectivity that is more
primordial than rational subjectivity. [10] It is not limited by the sphere of one's
own ideas, but by the egoist self that goes out to enjoy the world. What is
important here is that, unlike the sphere of ideas, sensibility reaches further out
into the domain of the extra-mental. [11]
Having established subjectivity on the level of sensibility provides Levinas with a
place "where" the other can be met, not in the cabinet of consciousness, but on the
street, in the classroom, or in the workplace, where the egoism of enjoyment has the
possibility of becoming "filled" with sensations. Furthermore, establishing
subjectivity on the level of sensibility leads Levinas to a point where he can
establish that the human subject is, first and foremost, passive. Sensations come to
me from the outside only to be swallowed up on the inside. But, unlike the contents
of ideas, sensations are discovered, given. They are not invented.
The ethical moment, the moment in which the moral "ought" shows itself, is found,
for Levinas, on the level of sensibility when the egoist self comes across something
that it wants to enjoy, something that it wants to make a part of itself, but
cannot. That which the self wants to enjoy but cannot is the other person. The
reason that it cannot enjoy the other person is not rooted in some deficiency of
sensibility, but in the other person who pushes back, as it were, who does not allow
him/herself to be consumed in the egoism of my enjoyment. The other resists
consumption. The presence of the other, on this level, is not, properly speaking,
known. The other person is encountered as a felt weight against me.
Thus, for Levinas, the other has some power over me. Indeed, the other is a
transcendence that comes from beyond the categories of my thought, from beyond the
world, from the other side of Being. Because of the other-worldliness of the
epiphany of the other in the face-to-face, the face speaks thus: "I am not yours to
be enjoyed: I am absolutely other," or to put the claim in Levinas' terms, "thou
shalt not kill."
John Burke describes the initial approach of the other person in terms of
astonishment or surprise. In so doing, he also notes the essential element of
radical passivity that arises from contact with the other person. He writes, "My
astonishment seems less an activity of mine, a willful projection of a function of
my interests, than the deepest mode of passivity." [12] Vulnerability arises from
such a surprise, a being caught off guard by the epiphany of the other person. My
solitude is invaded by the other person who comes from nowhere. [13]
This element of "catching off-guard" is important here, because it indicates more
about the presence of the other than the mere perception of the other. This catching
off-guard makes me aware of the presence of the other as an other who is due my
concern, not because I choose to give it to the other, but because it is demanded of
me. I want to consume the other, but cannot. [14] Several steps are involved in
elucidating this moment. In this discussion, I will present two of them: proximity
and substitution. These two notions will lead us to an understanding of ethical
responsibility in Levinas, though it must be understood that responsibility is not
derived from these steps; it is, rather, bound up with them.
The face of the other, that element of the other that is the ground of interpersonal
contact, indicates an immediacy with the other person that Levinas
calls "proximity." [15] Proximity is felt as immediate contact. Levinas writes:
... the proximity of the Other is not simply close to me in space, or close like a
parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar as I feel myself -- insofar as I
am -- responsible for him. It is a structure that in nowise resembles the
intentional relation which in knowledge attaches us to the object -- to no matter
what object, be it a human object. Proximity does not revert to this intentionality;
in particular it does not revert to the fact that the other is known to me. [16]
The proximity of the other demands a response; thus, Levinas claims that proximity
is responsibility, or the ability to respond. [17] Proximity must then be thought of
as a weight upon me that comes from the outside. But unlike Sartre who finds an
antagonism in this entry of the other from the outside, Levinas finds the
possibility of ethics, or the ground upon which ethics first shows itself. Not only
does the possibility of ethics show itself here, the self now takes on a different
characteristic. A new subjectivity is born that indicates that my self, as a
subject, is a primary projection towards the other as a move of responsibility to
the other. The very meaning of being a social subject is to be for-the-other.
Levinas writes, "Subjectivity is being a hostage." [18] In other words, subjectivity
arises from confrontation with the other person where the other is dominant, never
reducible to the domain of the same. Subjectivity means, in this context, subjection
to the other.
The self is a sub-jectum: it is under the weight of the universe ... the unity of
the universe is not what my gaze embraces in its unity of apperception, but what is
incumbent upon me from all sides, regards me, is my affair. [19]
The self is subjected to the other who comes from on high to intrude upon my
solitude and interrupt my egoist enjoyment. The self, feeling the exterior in the
guise of the other pass through its world, is already obligated to respond to the
transcendent other who holds the self hostage. In turn, this means that "the latent
birth of the subject occurs in obligation where no commitment was made." [20] I do
not agree to live ethically with the other at first, I am ordered to do so. The
meaning of my being a self is found in opposition to the other, as an essential
ability to respond to the other. I am, above all things, a social self indentured a
priori, made to stand in the place of the other.
This standing in the place of the other provides Levinas with one of his most
powerful concepts, "substitution." Substitution arises directly from the self as
held hostage by the other. It is the means by which my being responds to the other
before I know that it does. Indeed, substitution is a sign of how other-directed the
human being actually is. In comporting myself towards the other person in
substitution, my identity becomes concrete. "In substitution my being that belongs
to me and not to another is undone, and it is through substitution that I am
not 'another,' but me." [21]
If Levinas is correct here, the meaning of being a social subject is primarily to be
for the other person. Again, substitution is indicative of a sacrifice of self -- it
cannot be merely the idea of being in the place of the other person, for ideas have
yet to come on the scene. As Lingis suggests:
One is held to bear the burden of others: the substitution is a passive effect,
which one does not succeed in converting into an active initiative or into one's own
virtue. [22]
While it is true that Levinas is vague on the essence of substitution, the
suggestion seems to be that in being persecuted by an other person, I am made to
consider the person as an other. However, since such consideration cannot be made on
the conceptual level, this consideration becomes manifest in a comportment of the
self to the other person. Consideration for the other means being-considerate-for-
the-other. Substitution then is recognizing myself in the place of the other, not
with the force of a conceptual recognition, but in the sense of finding myself in
the place of the other as a hostage for the other. Substitution is the conversion of
my being as a subjection by the other into a subjection for the other.
To get a sense of how powerful Levinas' notion of substitution is, let me depart
from the vocabulary of his language for a moment and cast the discussion into
concrete terms. Suppose for a moment that you are walking down the street and the
person in front of you pushes a garbage can into the street. You might pick up the
garbage can, you might not -- but, certainly you will not feel like an injustice has
been done to the garbage can. Now suppose that in the same situation, the person in
front of you pushes another person into the street. Suppose further that this
person, while lying on the ground looks up at you. Do you "feel" the need to
respond? Levinas says that at this moment, the ethical command has been waged. You
are obligated to respond. If the desire to respond does not, at first, present
itself as a command, and you respond because you want to respond, then you have just
been witness to the depth that substitution has taken in your own being. The desire
to respond is already a responsiveness to the command of the other.
Some ethicists find that if we respond to the person because we feel a personal need
to do so, then we are really satisfying our own desire, and, as such, our action
does not have true moral worth. Levinas' point is more profound on this score. He
notes that there is a metaphysical explanation for why we have this desire to
respond. The explanation is rooted, once again, in substitution. First of all, the
person has a transcendence that the garbage can does not have, and secondly, we
have, in fact, already substituted ourselves for the other. [23] Within Levinas'
framework, the desire to help the other emerges because I am held hostage by the
other to the core of my being, and, in substitution, I am made to stand for the
other, before freedom and reason comes on the scene.
This brings us, at last, to Levinas' notion of ethical "responsibility." This notion
of responsibility, much in line with our concept of responsiveness, means that in
being a subject I am already in the grip of the Other. It also entails that all
thought enters on the scene after the epiphany of the other in the face-to-face.
This is to say that the other person precedes my ethical subjectivity, and that
ethics precedes any conceptual science. Inasmuch as responsibility is foundational
for all interpersonal relationships, it is in responsibility that we are going to
find a means to pass from an encounter with the real other person into ethics.
Levinas writes:
In [Otherwise than Being] I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and
fundamental mode of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms.
Ethics, here, does not supplement a preceding existential base [as Heidegger would
have it]; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as
responsibility. [24]
Furthermore, "the tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility" [25] as
well. Thus, responsibility is the link between the subject and the other person, or,
in more general terms, the source of the moral "ought" and the appearance of the
other person as person and not as thing are one and the same. There is no authentic
sociality apart from ethics, and there is no ethics apart from sociality. To say
that responsibility is foundational for ethics and interpersonal relations is to say
then not only that responsibility is what relates one subject to another, but it is
to go on to say that the meaning of the otherness of the other person is given in
responsibility, and not in my interpretation of the other person. The very meaning
of being an other person is "the one to whom I am responsible." Thus, the contact
with the real other person that I spoke of at the beginning of this lecture as
something presupposed by the very meaning of ethics turns out to be, in Levinas'
account, the source of the moral "ought."
Anthony F. Beavers
The University of Evansville
1. The process presented in this lecture follows the lines established in Totality
and Infinity. Between the writing of this text and the later text, Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas changed his mind on the ordering of the process.
See Lingis' introduction to Otherwise than Being for more inFORMation on this point.
2. The Philosophical Works of Descartes, eds. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
Ross, vol. II, Meditations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 162.
3. Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the
Transcendental Analytic of the "Critique of Pure Reason" (Gloucester, Mass: Peter
Smith, 1973), 32.
4. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
translated by Dorion Cairns (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), 50, 139.
5. The "world" for Levinas is always the world constituted in subjectivity. It
should not, therefore, be taken as extra-mental.
6. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 111.
7. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 113.
8. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 110.
9. Richard Cohen, "Emmanuel Levinas: Happiness is a Sensational Time," Philosophy
Today 25 (1981): 201. This excellent article shows Levinas' debt to Husserl's
phenomenology and his departure from it.
10. There are at least three different types of subjectivity in Levinas: 1) rational
subjectivity -- the self of representation that occurs in the "I think"; 2)
subjectivity of being -- the self of enjoyment and need; and 3) ethical
subjectivity -- the social self that arises from transcendent interpersonal contact.
11. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 109. "If cognition in the FORM of the
objectifying act does not seem to us to be at the level of the metaphysical
relation, this is not because the exteriority contemplated as an object, the theme,
would withdraw from the subject as fast as the abstractions proceed; on the
contrary, it does not withdraw far enough."
12. John Patrick Burke, "The Ethical Significance of the Face," ACPA Proceedings 56
(1982): 198.
13. See Burke, "The Ethical Significance of the Face," 198. The reason that the
other "comes from nowhere" is seen in the fact that the "world" for Levinas is
constituted by my reason and exists "for me." The Other comes from beyond the world,
hence, from a domain that is not able to be located by me.
14. Levinas makes a distinction between desire and need. Need differs from desire to
the extent that a need can be satisfied while a desire cannot. Thus, desire has a
metaphysical significance. Put concretely, I desire the other person, but since the
other cannot be reduced to the domain of the same, my desire for the other can never
be fulfilled.
15. See Andrew Tallon, "Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, and the Between: Buber
and Levinas on Affectivity and the Dialogical Principle," Thought 53 (1978):
304. "The radical passivity of Levinas's self ... emerges only with the advent of
the other, with the face of the other drawing near me; This nearness (proximité) is,
of course, not an intentionality by me or him alone, not a mental "state" or
activity, but meaning between us."
16. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillipe Nemo,
translated by Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 97. This
elegant little book goes a long way in making Levinas' thought approachable to the
uninitiated.
17. See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, translated by
Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 139: roximity,
difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility."
18. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
19. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
20. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 140.
21. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
22. Alphonso Lingis in the translator's introduction to Otherwise than Being, xxxi.
This introduction consists of a concise exposition of Levinas' thought in this work.
23. I wish to thank Carl Weisner for helping me to develop this point.
24. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 95.
25. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 97.
